The hearing will come to order.

Welcome, everyone, here this morning to what is the beginning

of, I hope, for lack of a better phrase, a national dialog on a very

important question. There are some very difficult decisions for the

President and for the Congress, and we think it’s important, the

members of this committee, that we begin to discuss what is being

discussed all over, but not here in the Congress so far.

The attacks of 9/11 have forever transformed how Americans see

the world. Through tragedy and pain, we have learned that we cannot

be complacent about events abroad. We cannot be complacent

about those who espouse hatred for us. We must confront clear

danger with a new sense of urgency and resolve.

Saddam Hussein’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, in my

view, is one of those clear dangers. Even if the right response to

his pursuit is not so crystal clear, one thing is clear. These weapons

must be dislodged from Saddam Hussein, or Saddam Hussein must

be dislodged from power. President Bush has stated his determination

to remove Saddam from power, a view many in Congress

share. If that course is pursued, in my view, it matters profoundly

how we do it and what we do after we succeed.

The decision to go to war can never be taken lightly. I believe

that a foreign policy, especially one that involves the use of force,

cannot be sustained in America without the informed consent of

the American people. And so just as we have done in other important

junctures in our history, the Foreign Relations Committee

today begins what I hope will be a national dialog on Iraq that

sheds more light than heat and helps inform the American people

so that we can have a more informed basis upon which they can

draw their own conclusions.

I’m very pleased and grateful for the close cooperation of my Republican

colleagues, Senator Helms, in absentia, and his staff, in

particular Senator Lugar and Senator Hagel, in putting these hearings

together. This is a bipartisan effort. It reminds me of the way

that things used to work in this committee when I joined it in 1973.

I want to say a word now about what the hearings are not about,

from my perspective. They are not designed to prejudice any particular

course of action. They are not intended to short-circuit the

debate taking place within the administration. I know I speak for

all members of the committee in saying at the outset that we recognize

our responsibility as we conduct these hearings to do so in a

way that reflects the magnitude of the decisions the administration

is wrestling with and the Congress will have to deal with.

We’ve coordinated these hearings closely with the White House.

We’re honoring the administration’s desire not to testify at this

time. We expect, at some later date, to convene hearings at which

the administration would send representatives to explain their

thinking once it has been clarified and determined. We do not expect

this week’s hearings to exhaust all aspects of this issue. They

are a beginning. But over the next 2 days, we hope to address several

fundamental questions.

First, what is the threat from Iraq? Obviously, to fully answer

this question will require us to have additional and closed hearings

on top of hearings in S–407 and discussions we’ve already had with

the intelligence community. Second, depending on our assessment

of the threat—or depending on one’s assessment of the threat, what

is the appropriate response? And, third, how do Iraq’s neighbors,

other countries in the region, and our allies see the, ‘‘Iraqi problem’’?

And, fourth, and maybe most important, if we participate in

Saddam’s departure, what are our responsibilities the day after?

In my judgment, President Bush is right to be concerned about

Saddam Hussein’s relentless pursuit of weapons of mass destruction

and the possibility that he may use them or share them with

terrorists. Other regimes hostile to the United States and our allies

already have or seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction. What

distinguishes Saddam is that he has used them against his own

people and against Iran. And for nearly 4 years now Iraq has

blocked the return of U.N. weapons inspectors.

We want to explore Saddam’s track record in acquiring, making,

and using weapons of mass destruction and the likelihood, in the

opinion of the experts that will come before us in the next 2 days—

the likelihood that he would share them with terrorists.

We want to know what capabilities Saddam has been able to rebuild

since the inspectors were forced out of Iraq and what he now

has or might soon acquire. We want to understand his conventional

military strength and what dangers he poses to his neighbors as

well as to our forces, should they intervene.

Once we have established a better understanding of the threat,

we want to look at the possible responses. The containment strategy

pursued since the end of the gulf war and apparently supported

by some in our military has kept Saddam boxed in. Some

advocates for continuing this strategy believe it’s exceeded their expectations.

And some others advocate the continuation coupled

with tough, unfettered weapons inspection. How practical is that?

Others believe that containment raises the risks Saddam will continue

to play cat and mouse with the inspectors, build more weapons

of mass destruction and share them with those who wouldn’t

hesitate to use them against us. In this view, if we wait for the

danger to become clear and present, it could become too late. It

could be too late. Acting to change the regime, in this view, may

be a better course.

But a military response also raises questions. Some fear that attacking

Saddam Hussein would precipitate the very thing we’re

trying to prevent, his last resort to weapons of mass destruction.

We also have to ask whether resources can be shifted to a major

military enterprise in Iraq without compromising the war on terror

in other parts of the world.

My father has an expression, God love him. He says, ‘‘If everything’s

equally important to you, Joe, nothing is important.’’ How

do we prioritize? What is the relative value? What are the costs?

We have to inquire about the cost of a major military campaign

and the impact on our economy. As pointed out yesterday in one

of the major newspapers in America, in today’s dollars, the cost of

the gulf war was about $75 billion. Our allies paid 80 percent of

that, including the Japanese. If we go it alone, does it matter? Will

we encompass and take on the whole responsibility? What impact

will that have on American security and the economy? We have to

consider what support we’re likely to get from our key allies in the

Middle East and Europe, and we must examine whether there are

any consequences if we move for regional stability.

Finally, the least explored, in my view, but in many ways the

most critical question relates to our responsibilities, if any, for the

day after Saddam is taken down, if taken down by the use of the

U.S. military. This is not a theoretical exercise. In Afghanistan, the

war was prosecuted exceptionally well, in my view, but the followthrough

commitment to Afghanistan security and reconstruction

has, in my judgment, fallen short.

It would be a tragedy if we removed a tyrant in Iraq, only to

leave chaos in its wake. The long suffering Iraqi people need to

know a regime change would benefit them. So do Iraq’s neighbors.

We need a better understanding of what it would take to secure

Iraq and rebuild it economically and politically. Answering these

questions could improve the prospects for military success by demonstrating

to Iraqis that we are committed to staying for the long haul.

These are just some of the questions we hope to address today

and tomorrow and in future hearings and, no doubt, in the fall. In

short, we need to weigh the risks of action versus the risks of inaction.

To reiterate my key point, if we expect the American people to

support their government over the long haul when it makes a difficult

decision, if the possibility exists that we may ask hundreds

of thousands of our young men and women in uniform to put themselves

in harm’s way, if it is the consensus or a decision reached

by the administration that thousands or tens of thousands of troops

would be required to remain behind for an extended period of time,

if those measures are required, then we must gain, in my view, the

informed consent of the American people.

I welcome our witnesses today. We have a group of extremely

competent people, one of whom got on a plane in Sydney and traveled

24 hours straight to be here for this hearing, and others who

have come from long distances, as well. These are men and women

of stature, background knowledge, academic and practical understanding

of the region and the country, and we’re anxious to hear from them.

I would now ask Senator Lugar if he would like to make an opening

statement. And although we usually reserve opening statements

just to the ranking member and the chairman, I would,

since we only have a few members here at the moment, invite my

other three colleagues if they would like to make a, ‘‘short’’—not as

long as the chairman’s—short statement.

When you get to be chairman, you can make long statements. Senator Lugar.

Thank you.

Gentlemen, I’ve just been informed that there are going to be

four rollcall votes in a row starting at 11 o’clock, so I am going to

rescind my offer. And if you want to put your statements in the

record or make a 1-minute statement, literally, do that, but we’ll

never get to our witnesses.

Would anybody like to make a very brief opening comment?

Without objection, it will be.

And every Senator’s statement will be placed in

the record if they have one. I sincerely apologize for that. Senator Dodd.

Yes.

And the heavier that payload the

less distance that same missile could travel.

Sure.

All right, thank you.

Let me just say, to reinforce one point, yesterday at the White

House at the signing of the corporate responsibility bill, the President

came up to me in the audience and shook my hand and

thanked me for holding these hearings.

I want to make it clear. The administration has told me they

have not made a decision yet. I take them at their word. They’ve

indicated to me there’s nothing in the near-term. I take them at

their word. And we have not given a veto right on how we proceed,

but we’ve asked for their cooperation, offered input, as we did from

others, any witnesses they would like to have. And so, so far, this

is as I think it should be, the beginning of an open discussion in

a bipartisan way to examine the major issues we’ve outlined here.

Let me begin with our first panel. And as I referenced indirectly,

Ambassador Richard Butler—and I sincerely thank him for literally

getting in a plane in Sydney and coming, and he obviously

thinks these hearings are important or he wouldn’t have made that trip.

Richard Butler has served as the executive chairman of the

United Nations Special Commission, the so-called UNSCOM, from

1997 to 1999. He was also the Permanent Representative of Australia

to the United Nations from 1992 to 1997. He’s currently a

diplomat in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations and one

of the most articulate men in the world, actually, on the subject of

Saddam Hussein and Iraq, and we’re delighted he’s here.

Dr. Hamza is the director of the Council for Middle Eastern Affairs

in New York. He was a top Iraqi nuclear engineer working on

Iraq’s nuclear weapons program until he defected in 1994. He is

the author of the book, ‘‘Saddam’s Bombmaker,’’ and we appreciate

him being here and look forward to his testimony.

And a man we often see on television and who’s been kind

enough to share his wisdom with this committee on many occasions,

Professor Anthony H. Cordesman. Professor Cordesman

holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for

Strategic and International Studies. He’s also a national security

analyst for ABC, and we thank him, as well, for being here.

Gentlemen, if you could proceed. And I realize we told you 5 minutes.

I’m not going to hold you literally to 5 minutes. What you

have to say is so important. But if you can keep it in the range

of 10 minutes, because we want to be able to engage you. And we

will—and you’ve all been here before—maybe Dr. Hamza hasn’t—

we’re going to have to break about probably ten after 11 and be

gone for 40 minutes. With a little bit of luck, we will be able to get

this panel finished, or if we’re still engaged, we’ll ask you to hang around, if you can.

But, with that, why don’t I know yield the floor to you, Mr. Ambassador.

And, again, thank you for the effort and your service.

Your entire statement will be placed in the

record for our colleagues.

Well, we would welcome your input.

Thank you. I particularly agree with your last

point. I have been pushing for 8 months that he should be indicted

as a war criminal. Even if we cannot get him, he should be indicted

as a war criminal so the world understands.

Doctor, welcome.

The floor is yours.

Thank you very much, doctor.

Professor Cordesman.

Without objection, your statement will be placed

in the record.

Thank you very much.

Why don’t we, in the interest of time, limit our questions in this

first round to 5 minutes? Let me begin.

The thrust of your statement, professor, is that if we’re going to

go, we should go at Saddam with a serious force, that this idea

being discussed of inside out and a relatively small number of people

and decapitation, I would assess from your comments, you

think would not be a prudent way to proceed. Am I misreading

you?

Now, doctor, let me ask you. In your book, you

discuss the merits of helping scientists working on the regime’s

weapons of mass destruction to escape Iraq. Based on your experience,

what was the missing ingredient, if there was one, in Iraq’s

weapons of mass destruction program, its human expertise for research,

its design and production, or raw ingredients—for example

highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons? What was the weakest

link?

Do you have any reason to believe they have surmounted

those bottlenecks?

How much does Saddam rely upon the expertise

of scientists—foreign scientists for such as unemployed Russian scientists

and others? How much of the scientific research and development

is done by non-Iraqis?

In conclusion, how confident are you about your

assertion that you used in your statement saying that by 2005 you

believe the Iraqi Government will have enough fissile material to

build three nuclear weapons?

When was that assessment made?

My time is up.

Senator Lugar.

Senator Dodd.

If the Senator would yield for just a

moment in a housekeeping matter. There are two roll call votes

back to back, and so I’d suggest we stay until toward the end of

this and then, with the permission of my friend from Florida, I’ll

go to the Senator from California, and we’ll kind of do reverse this time. OK?

I’m sorry. Go ahead, Senator.

You sure do.

Thank you very much.

Can I ask for a point of clarification, professor? Without Qatar,

without Bahrain, without Kuwait, is it possible to launch successfully

a military action that has a high probability of success and

a relatively low probability of high casualties for American forces?

I thank you. I appreciate the indulgence of my

colleagues.

Senator Hagel. Obviously, we don’t have the vote at 11 yet, so

we’re just going to keep going. So why don’t you proceed, Senator,

and we’ll go through this round.

Will you all be able to stay? Again, they said four votes, which

means it will be at least 50 minutes. Are you able to do that? We

may have to go through lunch here, because we have very important

panels to follow you. We would make the room available. We

don’t want to call it the back room, but we would make the anteroom

here available to you all, and maybe we can get you something

to drink—coffee or a cold drink of some kind.

Senator Hagel.

Sure.

We’re going to come back. One of the things I’m

sure we’re going to be asking you about is the extent that Saddam

Hussein is the unique element in this picture. What is Iraq without

Saddam Hussein? How dangerous is it, even if he dropped dead tomorrow,

how would that—all by itself, nothing else, just Saddam

Hussein—how would that alter the situation, if at all?

The hearing will come to order. I thank our witnesses

for your indulgence. Of all days to have four votes back to

back, it was today. I apologize for that.

Let me now yield to Senator Feingold. I think he’s next in line.

Thank you very much.

Senator Lugar.

Senator Nelson.

Please.

And I’m going to ask a couple of questions, and

then I’ll yield to my colleague, and I’ll try to do this quickly.

Mr. Ambassador, I share your view that Saddam, at all costs,

will agree to no inspection that may cost him his weapons of mass

destruction. But I have a different question. Is it possible to construct

an inspection regime that—if it were agreed; we both agree

it’s not likely to be, but if it were, that it would efficacious, that

you would have some—how intrusive would it have to be in order

to have some significant expectation that you would be able to root

out the bulk of his biological, chemical, and/or potential nuclear capacity?

Well, some in our Defense Department make the

argument that, notwithstanding the fact you theoretically could be

allowed to go anywhere anytime, that over the last 4 years, the regime

has been able to, through mobilizing, if you will—making mobile

their biological-weapons laboratories and digging deep into the

ground in places where we don’t know—even if we were free to

roam, we would still not be able to do the job.

Well, that’s why I asked the question.

I want to get—yes, Professor.

I acknowledge that, understand that. That is

able to be done by Iraq, even if Saddam is gone.

And so I think we should be looking for here—

at least I’m looking for the broadest, most rational understanding

of what our options are and what we can and cannot be certain of.

And the truth is there’s a lot of things we can’t be certain of, but

everything is probabilities as we move down this road.

I realize my time is up. I’m going to followup, though, with the

permission of my colleagues, on one question, and that relates to

nuclear capability able to be married to a missile, a medium-range

or longer-range missile. Both of you who have been involved in the

inspection side of this in the past, and you, doctor, who were involved

in the production side, if you will, to use the phrase loosely,

would be as qualified as any witnesses we’re going to have to answer

the following question, and that is that if Saddam were successful

in building an intermediate-range missile or a missile that

is—much further than 160 kilometers, and if he were able to provide

a nuclear warhead on that missile—as we all know, it’s a heck

of a lot easier to put a chemical or biological warhead, for no other

reason, for the layman out there, other than the pure weight of the

object—would we be able to have enough notice of that, not in

terms of whether they developed the capacity on the nuclear side,

but on this missile side, and would we be able to preemptively

move against that system, that nuclear delivery system, as others

have on other occasions? Do you understand my question?

Doctor Hamza.

What you mean by that is, it has to be hardened

enough so the vibration and the thrust and the force and the warhead

can sustain that and stay intact, correct?

OK.

By ‘‘payload,’’ you mean——

It’s important, I think, if this is being listened

to by the American people. The payload means the actual weapon

that sits on top of that missile——

If you had a light payload, it can travel further.

If a heavier payload, it travels less far. Correct?

All right.

Mr. Ambassador.

For the record, your time ended when?

Well, my question is where do you think they

are?

In the past, and, Professor, I’d like you to respond,

as well. In the past—I’ve been doing this strategic doctrine

issue for 30 years—when we were talking about Russia, we used

to always say Russia would never deploy what they haven’t flight

tested. Russian would never rest—no nation would rest its security

based upon a missile—or a system that hadn’t been tested.

I assume we’re operating on a different premise relative to this

fellow, but would there not—add to your answer, if you would,

whether or not there would be a requirement for some, or is there

a requirement for any flight testing in any way for this guy to engage

in the contemplated use of that combination of a missile and

a warhead that’s nuclear?

Again, for our listeners, we’re talking about a

whole system. We’re talking about an intermediate or a short-range

nuclear missile. We’re not talking——

Isn’t that a difference, though, between testing

a chemical agent and relying upon testing—I mean, using, without

having tested at all, a nuclear warhead on a missile?

Would be irrelevant to him?

If I can translate what you just said, it’s difficult,

and it’s important.

I have one concluding question, and I’ll yield a longer round to

each of my colleagues, as I have had.

If we operate on the premise—and I have been corralling men

and women like you for the past year, who are experts in your

field, and boring them to death with questions for hours on end in

my office trying to gain as much knowledge and background as I

can. And one of the things, whether people are, quote, ‘‘for moving

or not moving,’’ one consensus I seem to get from whomever I

speak with wherever they are in the equation of moving sooner

than later or not moving at all or containing or whatever is that

this is a different-breed-of-cat, this fellow, and that if, in fact, he

is cornered, if, in fact, his regime is about to come to an end, that’s

the place at which he is the most dangerous, that’s the place he’s

most likely to use whatever it is that he has that can be the most

destructive. And the thing that I hear most often stated is that the

issue is whether or not he will preemptively use any weapon of

mass destruction, whether he will use it only in response to an invasion,

or whether he will use it as a last-ditch effort to save himself

by either broadening this to a regional war or whatever.

What evidence do we have that contained and beyond we’ve provoked

so far, unprovoked beyond this point, is that he would offensively,

without further provocation, use a weapon of mass destruction,

when, in fact, the rationale offered by all of you is that this

is a guy whose first and foremost desire is to stay in power? Explain

that—what seems to me to be a bit of a conundrum here.

Why would he offensively—for example, the discussion now is

we’d better move now, not because he’ll have weapons to blackmail

us as they get more sophisticated, but that he may very well deliver

these weapons into the hands of terrorists to go do his dirty

work, or he would preemptively strike Israel, strike American

forces in the region, strike neighbors, et cetera. Why would he do

that? What in his past would indicate he would do that knowing

that, as one of you said, he would invite an incredible response?

That seems certain to me he would invite an overwhelming response.

A lot of innocent people would die in the interim, but—any

comment on that? And then I’ll yield.

I appreciate the answer, because—I am not trying

to make a case. I’m trying to understand a point, because my

instinct, talking to so many people, is that the real concern is being

able to leverage that capability, as opposed to him preemptively

waking up one morning saying, ‘‘You know, I’m going to take out

Riyadh,’’ or ‘‘I’m going to take out Tel Aviv,’’ or ‘‘I’m going to take

out Ankara,’’ assuming he had the range to do that, which he

doesn’t, not at this point. But, at any rate, do you want to conclude?

I’ve really gone beyond my time.

I thank you.

And I thank Senator Chafee for his indulgence. Fire away, Senator.

If the Senator will yield just for a moment. I

apologize, but——

The Senator from Florida is going to

chair the hearing. I have to leave for a few minutes. And after this

panel is over, we’ll recess for 45 minutes for lunch. I’m not suggesting

you finish now. When the panel is finished, we’ll recess for

45 minutes.

I assure you, Senator, there are other witnesses coming along

who think the policy containment is just fine. So I hope you’ll find

this is extremely balanced when we finish the whole 2 days of

hearings.

But I thank you for your letting me interrupt, and I turn the

gavel over to the Senator from Florida.

The hearing will please come to order. I want to

thank all of our witnesses for putting up with this unusual schedule.

Most of you who have been around here understand it, and I

know, Mr. Ambassador, you have. It is always dangerous to schedule

serious hearings the last week the Senate is going to be in session

for a while, but I felt these were so important, as did Senator

Hagel, that we should move forward, so again I apologize for the

interruptions.

Our second panel is an equally significant panel, and will shed

a good deal of light on the issues we are discussing here. Our first

panelist is Ambassador Robert Gallucci. He is currently dean of

Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. I want you to

know, dean, that I almost made a mistake when I spoke over at

Georgetown. I was presented with a Georgetown chair that is sitting

in my office, with a Georgetown seal on it, and as we were

about to file my financial disclosure I was sitting on the chair and

my secretary said, are you sure you filed everything, and I said, ev-

erything I know. She said, how about what you are sitting on, and

it had not been, and so I might have been before the Ethics Committee

had I not been sitting in that chair.

At any rate, he served as Ambassador at Large from 1994 to

1996, Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs

from 1992 to 1994, and Deputy Executive Chairman of the U.N.

Special Commission from 1991 to 1992 overseeing the disarmament

of Iraq, better known as UNSCOM.

We also have Mr. Charles Duelfer, who has briefed me in the

past, and I have been ungracious enough to mispronounce his

name, but he is currently visiting resident scholar at the Center for

Strategic and International Studies, he served as Deputy Executive

Chairman of the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq from 1993 until

its termination in 2000, and for the last several months of

UNSCOM’s existence he served as acting chairman.

General Joseph Hoar, U.S. Marine Corps, retired. General Hoar

served as commander in chief of the U.S. Central Command from

1991 to 1994. He was Deputy for Operations for the Marine Corps

during Desert Storm, retired in 1994 after a 37-year career in the

Marine Corps, and we appreciate you being here, general.

Lt. Gen. Thomas McInerney retired from the Air Force in 1994.

Prior to his retirement, Lieutenant General McInerney served as

Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force. He is currently

a consultant.

And Dr. Morton Halperin. Mort is currently a senior fellow at the

Council on Foreign Relations and the Washington director of Open

Society Institute. He was Director of the Policy Planning Staff for

the Department of State from 1998 to 2001. He served as Special

Assistant to the President, and Senior Director for Democracy at

the National Security Council from 1994 to 1996, and was the Consultant

to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense

for Policy. He also, in an earlier incarnation, was the man

who I went to most for advice relating to civil liberties issues.

Welcome to you all, and I would invite you in the order you have

been called to give your statements, if you would. Welcome again,

Mr. Ambassador.

Without objection.

Thank you very much, dean.

Mr. Duelfer.

It will be.

Thank you very much.

General Hoar.

Thank you, general.

Lieutenant General McInerney.

Thank you.

Dr. Halperin.

Thank you very much. We have good attendance.

We will try to keep this to 5-minute rounds the first time around.

Let me begin by asking you, Dr. Halperin, if you were still in the

government and you had clear and convincing proof that Saddam

had a nuclear capacity that was capable of being launched on a

missile platform, would that change your view? In other words, the

containment plus, I assume the containment plus is designed to diminish

the prospect that he gains that ultimate capability. I think

we would both say that was the worst capability. Assume that you

were convinced that existed. Would that change your priorities?

Which leads me to the next question. Do you

think that, were he able to build, buy, steal, possess that nuclear

capability able to be delivered by a missile, do you have any degree

of confidence that that could be destroyed, absent a military invasion

of feet on the ground, troops on the ground?

How would a successful containment plus policy

solve or deal with the potential of Saddam giving weapons of mass

destruction to terrorists?

Let me ask any of you who wish to respond to

this question. All of this discussion we are having today, we will

have in the future, and we have had in the past comes down to relative

risks and tradeoffs.

You all have said to one degree or another that it matters where

we have a place from which to stage our invasion, if there is an

invasion, whether it is a relatively small number of forces or it is

a 1/4 million forces, whatever it is.

You have all indicated that if, in fact, Saddam possess more capability

relative to the weapons of mass destruction we know he

has, and we are not exactly sure what he has, that presents a serious

threat to us.

You have also indicated that it would be better if we had others

with us than go it alone, either before, during, or after, and so it

all comes down, it seems to me, to vastly oversimplify it, to tradeoffs

here. If we go alone now, no one knows the cost, but we would

succeed, we would ostensibly change the regime, we would hopefully

be able to destroy the weapons of mass destruction that exist

over a period of time in the country, but we may very well

radicalize the rest of the world.

We may pick up a bill that is $70, $80 billion. We may have to

have extensive commitment of U.S. forces for an extended period

of time in Iraq, and if we do not do that, we find ourselves in the

position where we increase the possibility he could destabilize the

region preemptively himself, he could move and use the weapons

of mass destruction as leverage for blackmailing actions in the region,

and so on.

So in weighing the risks and the tradeoffs here, how important

is it and to what degree do each of you feel you have to be certain

he possesses the weapons of mass destruction that can be effectively

delivered, whether it is a chemical weapon, whether it is a

biological weapon, or whether it is a nuclear weapon? How important

in each of your calculus is that question that he has, or is

close to having, or it is not worth the risk of determining any

longer, or waiting any longer, whether he has weapons of mass destruction

that are deliverable and efficacious?

Because you heard the testimony earlier, and I know you all are

very sophisticated. So, the mere fact you have the ability to

produce a chemical weapon and/or a biological agent does not mean

you can effectively disperse it, does not mean it can have the efficacy

that it would in our hands, for example, so how much of your

calculus is dependent upon your sense of his capacity to possess

and deliver these weapons?

Anybody else? Yes.

Dean.

The question for me is, do we have the time to

do this right? Doing it right means we could, in my view, work out

arrangements with Russia. We could, in my view, deal with the situation

in the Middle East much better than we have now. We

could, in fact, be much better situated if we did some very important

things over the next 6 to 8 months that we do not have time

to do now, and the question is, how much time do we have?

But at any rate, I have trespassed upon your time. I will move

to the Senator Lugar.

Senator Kerry.

Senator Hagel.

Does anyone disagree with that point? Does anyone

disagree with the point just made? Repeat the last point,

please.

Stop right there, please. Does anyone disagree

with that specific point, and if so, how?

Except the Kurds. That is like saying keep the

United States together, except the Southwest.

Let me make it clear, I am not trying to start

an argument. I am trying to determine throughout these hearings

where there are points of consensus on major, major questions, and

a major question is, to me at least, what after? That is why I asked

the question.

I would yield to Senator Feingold.

Senator Chafee.

Thank you, gentlemen. Do you want to take a 5-

minute break? Your constitutions are admirable.

The Senator from Florida.

The Senator from West Virginia. He was here before

everybody, and I was getting to him last, for which I apologize.

The Senator from West Virginia.

Thank you very much.

Thank you very much.

Senator Nelson.

You are an extremely valuable panel, and we

have one more panel, but I cannot resist, I have two more questions,

and I would ask my colleagues if they have one or two more.

This is too important to let you go.

Each of you have a slightly different prescription as to how to

proceed. To speak to the point made by Senator Rockefeller, there

is necessarily uncertainty in all of the prescriptions. What I have

gleaned from you all, that you all seem to have in common, although

slightly different ways of approaching what you would propose

to a President, for example, at this moment, is that none of

you seem to think that the groundwork that is needed to be done

has been done thus far for your individual approaches, each one of

you. They are all different, slightly different. They are different in

degree.

But what I have gotten so far this morning and this afternoon

is that whether it is containment plus, whether it is a robust regime

with a ready force demonstrating that we need it, or what is

in between, is that the spadework necessary to be able to successfully

bring to fruition each of your suggested courses of action has

not been done yet. Is that correct?

Any of you, for example, were Senator Lugar President, and tomorrow

he turned to you and said, OK, I am about to implement

full blown your proposal, any one of you, would all of you say, I

am ready to go, we are ready to go right now, or would you say,

by the way, we have got to do a lot more work, we have not done

this with the Russians, we have not done this with the Kuwaitis,

we have not moved this with the Europeans, we have not done this

with the—I mean, am I right, or am I getting this wrong here?

There is more that has to be done for every one of the prescriptions,

right, in terms of spadework?

It is intended to be, because I do not want to

make any mistake here, not because I want you to reach the same

conclusion. I just want to make sure that I understand it, because

look, gentlemen, I want to make it clear this is maybe the best way

in simple terms that folks in my home town of Claymont will understand,

I think, our obligation at the end of the day whenever

that is—I do not mean today—is to say to the American people,

here are the choices. You pay your money, and this is the chance

you take. The upside or the downside is clear.

If he has to take the one side, nuclear weapons. Today, tomorrow,

6 months or 6 years from now, that is a very bad thing. If he

has the ability to deliver that over a range that is longer than a

couple of miles, that is even a worse thing, and because of his previous

mode of action, because of what the perception on the part

of Iraqi military and civilian leaders around him is about, our ability

to absorb pain and suffering, the consensus seems to be he

would likely at some point use either preemptively or in response

these weapons, and therefore we should do something about this,

and if we did something about it and were able to wipe him out,

in the sense of take him out and get rid of those weapons, it would

be a very good thing, because the potential for things in the region

to get better would be there. That is the upside, the danger and

the upside.

But don’t we have to say to the American people, and it may be

I am truly—I have not reached a conclusion about this, but if, for

example, we were struck with a weapon preemptively, we would respond,

and would we not have to say to the American people, these

are the likely consequences of our responding, or preemptively

moving. One would be, there would be loss of life, loss of American

life. It is not likely that we are going to be able to do this without

something between a couple and maybe 10,000 lives lost, depending

upon the ability and the efficacy of the chemical or biological

weapons he may have.

The second thing we are going to have to say to them is, we are

going to have to mobilize on a grand scale, say goodbye to daddy

for Labor Day and mommy for Halloween, because the Reserves

and the National Guard are going to have to be mobilized. Does

anybody think we can do any of what we are talking about without

mobilizing the Guard and the Reserves to a degree beyond which

they are now? So we have to tell people that, so they are not surprised

about it. It seems to me we have to tell them that.

We spent months, and I spent hours with the President, literally

on one occasion 2 hours with the President in the Oval Office, and

the only discussion was, in Afghanistan about the Arab street, and

our concern about—we went through this tortuous process in Afghanistan,

which was cake compared to this, worrying about what

this means from Djakarta to Tunisia. What about our interest in

the rest of the world? We have to tell people we do not know, right?

We do not know what the response would be.

We would also have to tell them that there is going to be a spike

in oil prices. The idea that this could occur without a spike—maybe

we should pay all these prices, but we have to tell them that there

is going to be a spike in oil prices. It may be temporary, it may

be long lasting, but there is going to be a spike. It is going to have

economic consequences.

And third, if we do it by ourselves, we cannot expect the rest of

the world to pick up 80 percent of the tab, whether it is $40 billion,

$80 billion, $100 billion, whatever it is, right?

And we are going to have to say that it could impact upon, it will

impact on, and we know, you may not, on the deficit. There will

be a deficit, or some of my friends will have to give up a tax cut,

right? I mean, those are the choices we have to make.

And last, that there is at least a serious prospect

that we are going to have to keep a lot of Americans in place for

a long time in an area of the world that may mean they are not

going to come home for Christmas, this Christmas anyway, and

probably for a while. Is that a fair statement?

So I am not suggesting that we should not act at this point. I

do not know enough to know yet, but I am suggesting one of the

objectives, and the reason I am so thankful for you all giving us

your time and the panels that will come, is I think we have an obligation

to say to the American people—I for one, for example, if I

knew he had these weapons, and the Lord came down and sat up

here and said, Joe boy, he has them and he is going to move, I

would say we have got to pay all of these prices, we have got to

pay them all, but I have an obligation to tell the American people

that this is going to be the cost, the parameters of the cost.

And so I hope that we can—and you will continue to be available

to us, because I am convinced the President is taking this very seriously.

I realize he talks a lot about regime change, and some people

think he talks about it very blithely. I do not think he is unaware,

the deeper he gets into this, that this is very consequential,

and so I think that if we continue this, and I hate the word, particularly

in the foreign policy context, dialog—that usually means

saying nothing, but if we continue this discussion as a Nation, we

will arrive at the right answer. We will arrive at the right answer,

and we will have the consensus of the American people.

But the puzzle for me is, among other things, it sure would be

nice if we got more people in on the deal. It sure would be beneficial

if we had more cooperation. It sure would be useful if we

could cut some of the risk, which I think if we have enough time

and enough ingenuity we could, and so one of the things we are

going to be exploring with the next panel, who are experts on the

region and on the culture, and for example, and I will end with

this, in Iraq, I mean, there are three centers of power.

There historically have been three centers of power in Iraq. They

are based on tribal and ethnic differences. They have significant

ramifications. It matters whether or not, how they react, and how

neighboring countries react to them, and so we are going to get an

opportunity to get into some of what Senator Lugar raised today

about how much do we know, how much do we know about the culture?

How much do we know about the consequences? How much

do we know abut the responses that are likely to come based upon

certain actions?

But the reason I bothered to say that before you leave, and I will

yield to my colleagues for questions for you, is, I just want you to

know, which I hope is obvious to you, I think you are making a significant

contribution here.

I think this is what we are supposed to be doing here, is going

through this as methodically as we can within the timeframe, and

we all think it is a slightly different timeframe. We have to be able

to make as informed a judgment as we can make, and that ultimately

the President of the United States is going to have to come

to us, not because we are making him, but that is the system, come

to us and say, here is what I have proposed, this is why I propose

it, these are the potential costs, and I for one think that had we

the time, we should and could make the case about weapons.

I mean, I guess—I will end with this. I do have one question, and

this will be it. Why is it that the rest of the world does not sense

the same urgency that we sense? Why is it that the Europeans,

who are physically closer, who have—and maybe it is because they

have more at stake in terms of energy. Why is it that they do not

sense this urgency, and why is it that the Arab world does not? Is

it because they doubt our resolve, and therefore they do not want

to get in the deal?

What is it that, when I speak to European heads of State, Foreign

Ministers, Defense Ministers, parliamentarians, members of

royal families, members of governments in the Middle East, why is

it that almost without exception they say we are exaggerating the

threat? Is it because—but you said, dean, you said look, you were

there. It was obvious. Everybody knew. At UNSCOM, they knew.

They had the model.

Why is it that Europeans talk, when you say nuclear they say,

oh, no, do not worry about that? What is the deal? Why are they

not concerned?

We have the bull’s-eye on our back, they do not,

is that the explanation?

Some of the people I respect and do not necessarily

agree with at the Defense Department make the opposite

argument that if you take care of Iraq the rest will fall in place,

including Israel and the Palestinian issue.

Does anyone agree with that proposition?

That is a good point.

Senator Lugar.

That is why I almost switched my registration

and voted for you in the primary.

Would you like to comment?

Thank you. Gentlemen, do either of you have any

more questions?

Gentlemen, I cannot thank you enough. This has been very helpful,

the start of this undertaking, and I warn you, we are like poor

relatives, when we are invited, we show up. You have invited us

to ask you again. I am warning you we may ask you back. I thank

you very, very much. You have been very helpful.

We have one more panel, a very important panel, and what I

would like to suggest is that—I realize it is 5 o’clock, but it is going

to take a little more time. Professor Telhami, Professor Ajami, Dr.

Kemp, and Ambassador Parris are our next panel, and we appreciate

their waiting so long. Please, gentlemen—I do not know

where they put your name tags, but if you would pick a seat, and

the tag will find you.

Professor Telhami is Anwar Sadat professor of peace and development

at the University of Maryland, and is a nonresident senior

fellow at the Brookings Institution, and has made himself available

to this committee, to me and many members of the committee, and

we truly appreciate his making himself available.

Professor Ajami is professor and director of Middle East studies

at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International

Studies, and he has recently been elected to the board of the Council

on Foreign Relations, again has been incredibly generous with

his time and advice.

Dr. Kemp is director of strategic programs of the Nixon Center.

From 1983 to 1985 he served as both Special Assistant to the

President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for

Near East and South Asian Affairs on the National Security Council.

And last but not least, Ambassador Mark Parris served as U.S.

Ambassador to Turkey from 1997 to 2000. He served as Special Assistant

to the President and Senior Director for the Near East and

South Asia at the National Security Council from 1995 to 1997.

Again, I thank you all for being here, and I thank you for your

patience. Maybe if you could proceed in the order you have been

introduced, and then we can get to questions. You see we have an

interested panel on this side, so I appreciate your time and hope

we do not ruin your dinner.

All of your statements will be placed in the

record to the extent that you do not do the whole statement.

Thank you very much, professor

I think it is your beard.

Feel free to respond to them now.

You say the embarrassment will be enormous?

Thank you, professor. Dr. Kemp, welcome.

Doctor, can you tell us how large the Shia population is in Iraq?

About 14 million, 15 million?

Thank you, doctor.

Mr. Ambassador.

Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

Let me ask you, Mr. Telhami, how would you test the choice between

regime change and nuclear weapons? You drew what I think

most Americans would think is a false distinction here that in fact

everyone we have heard from so far, almost everyone you hear is

reputed to be informed, says that there is no way of separating

Saddam from his nuclear, or weapons of mass destruction, and it

is a foolhardy exercise to attempt to do it, and therefore regime

change is the only alternative.

What you are suggesting is the possibility that Saddam stay in

power but not have his weapons of mass destruction, a deal that

I think you would find an awful lot of people ready to accept, probably,

but I mean, I do not quite understand.

But during the Clinton administration, where

there was not at the front end an explicit judgment made on regime

change, there was virtually no cooperation from Europe on

tougher inspection, and tougher—well, inspection regime to deal

with weapons of mass destruction.

I mean, I have had repeated discussions all during the nineties

with European leaders who always had some, from our perspective,

quite frankly lame excuse why it really was not a problem, so I am

wondering why you think that there is any prospect that if we

went back to the Europeans, and assume the President said to the

French and to others, look, here is the deal, you help us get rid—

you get full-blown inspections in there that are real, robust, genuine,

allow us to go, and the international community go wherever,

and if we are convinced that we have gotten rid of the weapons of

mass destruction, we are out of there.

Is that different from what Senator Lugar and

myself and I think to some degree Senator Hagel had been saying,

that we should be, for reasons relating to diplomacy, if not substance,

pushing as hard as we can for a more robust inspection regime

and put the Iraqis in the position where they resist, it is clear

they are resisting and it is clear why? I mean, is there a difference

in what you are saying? Am I missing something?

Dr. Kemp, if you were in your old job down at

the White House, what advice would you give the President about

what signals he should send to the Iranians now, if any, about any

move against Iraq on our part?

A last point. Professor Ajami, you indicated that

if we move against Iraq, the people in the region, who are looking

for this perfect storm, but the people in the region, heads of state

in the region will associate with us but not want to be seen with

us, not want us to kiss them in public.

What does that mean as that relates to the use of what you

heard in the last panel the two military guys saying, without

Qatar, without Bahrain, without Kuwait there is no reasonable

way in which we could sustain a massive U.S. military engagement?

Does your note about, will associate with us but very quietly,

does that mean they will not be able to give us access?

By the way, I have heard that when I was in

Bahrain. Anyway, you have clarified for me your statement about,

they would be willing to associate but not want to be seen.

Senator Hagel.

Senator Sarbanes.

Believe me, these guys can go anywhere you

want them to go.

That’s a very good question. I’m anxious to know

that.

In any order you’d like.

With the permission of my colleague, if I can add

a complicating factor, to the extent that you spoke about Iran, the

degree to which we settle the matter and keep peace in Bagdad

and other places by being in place and occupied does not that raise

the ante in Tehran that we, in fact, are seeking a permanent—basing

a permanent station there.

Please, doctor, if you would follow through with

your——

Are you talking about the same numbers Dr.

Kemp is? Are you talking about tens of thousands? And if you are,

we’re obviously talking about billions of dollars. Tens of thousands

of troops translates, over a short period of time, as billions of dollars.

What period of time do you envision?

Five years, 10 years?

Well, you guys didn’t thank us for anything——

Nobody pays attention to the chairman of the

Banking Committee, you know——

I’m joking. It’s a bad joke. I’m sorry.

Thank him for your pension.

OK, good.

Senator Chafee.

Gentlemen, I hate to do this to you, but just a

couple of more quick questions.

Do you have another question?

The premise that the question—the question as

to if Saddam is taken down, how long do we have to stay. The way

you answered was premised upon the notion that we had no cooperation

from anywhere else in the world, we didn’t have the Europeans

in the game, no one else got in the deal here.

Can you give me your best educated guess, as quickly as you can,

as to whether or not given that circumstance, that is, Saddam has

been removed, American forces are in the region in large numbers

where it may be part of the calculous of our European friends in

the EU that they be part of the process. And would it make a difference

if they not—it would, obviously, make an economic difference

to us, but would it make a difference if they were part of

the process in terms of the reaction in Iran, the reaction in Turkey,

the reaction in other parts of the world, of that part of the world?

As quickly as can you, it’s an awful long—I mean, a profound question——

Now, the second, I think more difficult question

that, at least, I haven’t resolved, is what do you believe would be

the calculous that our European friends would engage in to determine

whether or not it was in their interest to participate?

Quite frankly, if I had a choice of being alone

after the hard work was done, the way you phrase it——

Or being alone, getting the hard

work done, I would rather be alone getting the hard work done, because

I think the really hard work is done after.

Right.

I agree.

I would suggest that was the case in Bosnia and

they all came along after the fact. I remember pushing President

Clinton very hard, as hard as I politely—well, as hard as I could,

politely or otherwise, about moving to bomb in Kosovo. And he said

what about the French? I said, I promise you if you go, they’ll come.

Quite frankly, I’m more uncertain about it as it relates to Iraq.

My instinct is that—and, again, I’m not the expert, that’s why we

have you here—but my instinct Professor Ajami, is that if we succeed,

they will be willing to take a piece of this.

I would—let me ask you if there is any parallel here.

I was very disappointed, and I have been public about this, in

the failure of this administration to expand ISAF in Afghanistan,

especially on what I believe are not completely accurate grounds

that the Europeans weren’t ready to.

The Europeans—and I spent time there. I spent time with the

Europeans. They were totally prepared to, until we said we

wouldn’t be part of it. And as one European said, ‘‘if the big dog’s

not there, the little dogs don’t want to play.’’

And, so, I was under the distinct impression in everything, and

I have followed this very closely, that had we been willing to lead,

to expand ISAF, not even with numbers, just lead with commitment,

that ISAF—we would have gotten significant support from

Europe to expand ISAF in raw numbers.

Is that able to be—can you extrapolate from that that a similar—

assuming a military success in Iraq, is there any relevance to the

willingness in Iraq—I mean, in Afghanistan and what they may be

able to do in Iraq?

I agree.

I argue that’s the way—I don’t know why this

isn’t a win/win situation with the Russians. I mean, I actually had

a conversation that he has not dissuaded me from mentioning with

President Putin. You know, they think they’ve got tens of billions

of dollars waiting in the bank in terms of developing those oil

fields, which they can’t develop. They’re also owed about $11 billion.

I thought it was nine. When I said nine, he looked at me and he said 11.

It’s a little bit like having a very rich aunt that you don’t like,

and you know she has $40 million in the bank. You may not have

a relationship with her, but you’re not going to give up on her

knowing she has it in the bank.

These folks have it in the bank. And there was even a feeler put

out by Gazprom and—what’s the other oil company——

Lukoil that they would be interested

in a consortia with U.S. companies.

One of the things I found the Russians were worried about is we

go in, take out Iraq, they lose their contracts. I can’t imagine why

this isn’t a win/win situation if we were smart about this. But I

don’t get any sense that there is any movement on this by anyone

in the administration.

I kidded the President when he asked what I

would do. I said Mr. President, part of this is the vision thing, and

I’m not sure what the vision should be.

Gentlemen, with your permission, I have, rather than take more

of your time, it’s almost 7 o’clock, you’ve been so patient and helpful,

I have about two or three questions I would like to submit to

each of you in writing. There is no urgency in terms of getting

them back, and I would ask you publicly, to embarrass you into

having to say yes, would you be willing to come back if we continue

this process?

I thank you all very, very much, and we are adjourned.

The hearing will please come to order.

Yesterday, the Foreign Relations Committee began what I hope

will be a national discussion on Iraq. Let me say, again, how

pleased and grateful I am for the cooperation of my Republican colleagues,

starting with Senator Helms, in absentia, and his staff,

and Senator Lugar and Senator Hagel, for putting these hearings

together. This has been a team effort. This is not me sitting down

with a witness list and saying here we go.

As with yesterday we have coordinated these hearings with the

White House. Let me explain what I mean by coordination. We’re

a separate and equal branch of the government. We are not asking

permission of anybody to have any hearing, but we did ask them

for their input. We asked them for their input as we debate and

discuss this very difficult question the President has to resolve, and

they have been very cooperative.

We are honoring their desire not to testify at this time, but I do

not want to put the President in the position of having to make any

of these critical decisions prematurely. I take him at his word, their

word, the administration, that this is a process that’s entrained

and hopefully our hearings can help them elucidate their discussions

and their decision process, as well.

Yesterday, we addressed three critical questions, among others.

First, what is the threat from Iraq? Second, depending on the assessment

of that threat, what is viewed as the appropriate response

to the threat? And, third, how do Iraq’s neighbors and our

allies see the problem in Iraq?

We had excellent, excellent testimony from our panels yesterday,

but the one area in which I think we need considerably more discussion,

as well, is how Iraqi’s neighbors and our allies view the

problem of Iraq. We heard a wide range of views from an exceptionally

thoughtful group of witnesses spanning the spectrum of

points of view. I’m not sure we reached many definitive conclusions,

but I am convinced we’re asking the right questions. And to

get the answer, you have to ask the right question first.

We are, I hope, shedding some light on an important and complex

problem that the President faces, as well as the Congress and

the American people. Again, I’ll reiterate, I truly believe, and I

think all of my colleagues do, that a foreign policy will not be sustained,

particularly if it calls for the expenditure of American treasure

and blood, potentially, without the informed consent of the

American people.

Today, we’ll address a fourth question, and that’s not to suggest

that our incredibly qualified panel of witnesses is not free to speak

to any other issue, as well. We’ve attempted to ask the panels to

come to address a specific question, not because we think that’s the

only question they’re competent to respond to, but because we want

to order this some way at the outset.

And one question that I think is the least explored—and, as a

matter of fact, spontaneously to it, and this is yesterday, said they

thought it was the least explored, as well, and perhaps the most

important. If we participate or if we are the only participant in the

departure of Saddam, what are our responsibilities, if any, the day

after? This is an issue we’ve already been grappling with, and you

heard discussion in the Executive Committee meeting, on Afghanistan.

We are openly discussing it after a successful military action

in Afghanistan.

As I’ve said many times before, our military did a remarkable job

in prosecuting the war in Afghanistan. But, as you could hear from

the discussion here today and the vote here today, there is at least

a consensus that, in some part, we may be falling short—may be

falling short of the mark in winning the peace. The peace is a lot

harder to win than the war.

We’re not doing nearly enough, in my view, to secure Afghanistan

so that it can be rebuilt and so that it does not again become

a haven for terrorists. I’m pleased to announce, however, that what

you’ve just noticed just a few minutes ago, that I think we’ve got

a pretty strong consensus here to encourage the President, knowing

that he has our support, to go beyond Kabul with an international

security force.

In Iraq, we can’t afford to replace one despot with chaos. The

long suffering Iraqi people need to know the regime change will

benefit them. We heard that from every witness yesterday. So do

Iraqi’s neighbors. And the American people will want that assurance,

as well.

Already yesterday many of our witnesses talked about the critical

importance of thinking through the day after well in advance

of the day of, and even the day before we act in Iraq. Today we’ll

look at this issue in greater detail. We want a better understanding

of what it would take to secure Iraq and rebuild it economically

and politically. I don’t mean all by ourselves, but that may be the

position we put ourselves in.

So what does it mean if it’s all by ourselves? We need to know

how many U.S. forces will be required to stay, how long, and for

what purpose. We should consider the prospects of establishing a

stable and democratic state, but maybe a stable and not-so-democratic

state, and a democratic political order in Iraq, and what role

the Iraqi opposition might play in that, and what role might, as

I’ve had the great pleasure of having some of the witnesses here

today brief me privately over the last month, as I did the—several

panels before, and I know there’s some discussion among them and

among experts in the region as to the prospect of participation with

the civil servants that exist within Iraq, the military that exists

within Iraq, how willing they’d be willing to—some argue that this

could be done very readily, because we’d have overwhelming help.

Others suggest that it would not be done very readily at all. Others

suggest that it didn’t have to be paid for by us. Iraq’s a wealthy

country; they could fund this themselves—our presence, they could

fund there, and so on.

So these are all questions that are vitally important to our interests,

and we have, I think, put together, with the help of Senator

Helms, his staff, and the White House, requests from them, as well

as our staff, some very, very significant witnesses today.

So I welcome them, and I would now ask Senator Hagel if he

would like to make any opening statement. And after that, I would

move to introduce the witnesses and begin discussion.

Well, a couple of our colleagues indicated, because

they weren’t able to be here yesterday, they’d like to make

a, quote, ‘‘brief statement,’’ and I would yield to any colleague who

feels they want to do that right now.

Senator Sarbanes.

You can take more time, then.

I thank you, Senator.

Senator Dodd.

Knowing this panel, I can assure you that they

are as confident and as good.

Thank you very much.

I want to thank, again, in absentia, Ambassador Butler for getting

on a plane and flying 24 hours from Sydney, Australia to testify

at yesterday’s hearing, which was very worthwhile. He has

been always—sometimes controversial, always incredibly straightforward.

I thought his testimony was a good lead-off yesterday.

Today, we have a very significant panel. Dr. Phebe Marr has

spent 40 years as a scholar and analyst of Southwest Asia and is

a leading U.S. specialist on Iraq. Until 1998, she was senior fellow

at the Institute for International Strategic Studies at the National

Defense University. She retired from the U.S. Government in 1997.

She is the author of ‘‘A Modern History of Iraq.’’ I recommend

it to you. I have not read it all. I have read giant chunks of it. I

must tell you, there’s nothing like an appointment to focus one on

the mission. She was kind enough to come in to brief me with others

last week, and I spent time trying to make sure I knew what

she had written before she came in. And I didn’t get all the way

through it, professor, but I got close—or doctor.

Ms. Rend Rahim Francke is a founding member and the executive

director of the Iraq Foundation, a nonprofit organization that

promotes democracy and human rights in Iraq, and we thank her

for being here, as well.

And Dr. Al-Shabibi—am I pronouncing it correctly? You can call

me Bidden if I’m not, doctor—is an expert on the Iraqi economy,

currently serves as an advisor to the United Nations in Geneva,

Switzerland. He served in Iraq’s Ministry of Planning from 1997 to

1980, and in Iraq’s oil ministry from 1975 to 1977. Dr. Al-Shabibi

has traveled from Geneva, Switzerland, to testify, which puts him

right up there with Butler for having made the long-distance effort

to be here. We appreciate your traveling such a distance and to

share your experience and your thoughts with us, doctor, and we’re

anxious to hear you.

And Colonel Scott Feil, he served in Desert Storm from 1990 to

1991. He received a Purple Heart. He was chief of the Strategy Division

of the Joint Staff from 1999 to 2000. He’s now executive director

of the Role of American Military Power Program at the Association

of the United States Army. His responsibilities include codirecting

a program for post-conflict reconstruction.

I welcome you all here today, and we have just—actually, gentlemen,

we just had a 15-minute vote start. Rather than us doing this

piecemeal, in respect to the witnesses, maybe we should all go and

vote and then come back. It’ll take us about 7 to 10 minutes to do

that, and then we won’t have you seeing us get up and in and out

and it’s—we’re like Pavlov’s dog. When that bell goes off, we have

to go and vote.

So we will recess for 10 minutes, be back, and we’ll start with

you, Dr. Marr, when we come back.

The committee is in recess.

The hearing will come to order.

Thank you for your indulgence. Hopefully we won’t have many

interruptions, as we did yesterday.

Dr. Marr, again, welcome, and the floor is yours.

Doctor, thank you very much for a very clear

statement.

I’m going to, for the rest of my colleagues, put your entire statement

in the record so it’s made available to all Senators. And I

thank you.

Ms. Francke.

The entire statement will be placed in the record.

I should say, when you become a chairman, as

Senator Sarbanes will tell you, it entitles you to two things. One,

you get to turn the lights off, because you’re the last one—well, the

staff is actually the last to leave. And, second, you have to be the

one at the hearing.

Well, I enjoyed it.

Excuse me, would you say that again, please,

about taking administrative—I didn’t catch the first part of

your——

Can you explain what you mean by prepared and

enabled?

Whenever it’s convenient for you. Whenever you

think it fits best in your statement.

Please.

Can I say it another way to make sure that I understand

it? Because the Iraqi National Congress coming to see me

not long ago—and I apologize to my colleagues for the interruption,

but I hope this is clarifying, not disruptive—made the same statement

to me that you’ve just made.

If I can give an example so that I—to see if I understand it, assume

American forces went in. You are suggesting that the U.S.

Government work with members of the Iraqi National Congress

here in the United States or——

The Iraqi—well, OK, there are several different

opposition groups. They don’t fit into your little scheme, all of

them, but let’s assume, whatever it is, that we essentially come in

with a police commissioner who is an Iraqi from abroad in the Diaspora.

We essentially come in with a water commissioner. We essentially

come in with a commissioner—think about running the

city of Chicago—you know, we come in with someone to run the

Department of Public Works, someone to come in—so we have—in

a sense, what you’re suggesting is as we come in, instead of having—

in addition to NGOs, in addition to American civilians who

are helping set up the infrastructure or maintain it, you’re sug-

gesting that there be an Iraqi in the Diaspora who comes in who

is named, at least temporarily, by us as the person who’s going to

run this police department, that’s going to run the water department,

who’s going to be the commissioner of electricity. Is that the

kind of thing you mean? It that literal?

The reason I ask that, I have gotten so deep in

the weeds in Bosnia, then in Kosovo, and now in Iraq—which is not

the usual role a Senator should play, but I’ve actually taken scores

of hours to go there myself—and what I find is, unless you are literally

literal, none of this matters much. This is about making

practical things happen. In Kosovo, without someone who turns on

and off the street lights, you have a problem. And I’m just wondering

if that’s what you’re talking about.

OK, thank you. I apologize for the interruption.

Thank you very much.

Doctor, I want to make it clear, you were in the Ministry of Planning,

not the Minister. I want to make that clear.

You have to speak almost directly into the microphone

so people in the back can hear you.

I’m sorry, doctor. You really have to keep your

mouth almost on the microphone. You have to pull it very close. As

the distinguished Senator from South Carolina, Senator Thurmond

says, ‘‘You’ve got to talk into the machine.’’ Thank you.

Doctor, can you tell us if you know what the

total amount of reparations owed is, roughly, by Iraq? In other

words, what is the nature of the debt and reparations you’re referring

to, the magnitude, roughly?

Forty-two billion.

Thank you.

Yes.

Thank you.

Good luck.

I said good luck.

Thank you, doctor. Colonel.

Your statement will be placed in the record.

Let me say, colonel, I think it’s a very thoughtful

and very detailed statement.

And my first question to you, as a professional—now obviously

you are not speaking for CSIS, you’re not speaking for the military,

but you have had considerable experience in the military in these

planning processes. Do you have any reason to believe that this

kind of detailed planning that you have submitted to us as your—

I’ll oversimplify it—your ballpark estimate—it’s more than a ballpark

estimate of what would be needed—do you have a sense that,

as we speak right now, in the Pentagon there’s someone crunching

similar numbers? Do you think that, at the Pentagon, at this moment,

there is a team—and we have incredibly qualified people—

there is a team over there saying to the Secretary, ‘‘Look, this is

what we think the bottom-line number is for you, for us, when you

make your recommendation to the President.’’ Do you think the

planning has gone that far? Do you have any reason to believe

that?

I’m not asking for any access, because you don’t have any, to

classified information. I’m just trying to get a sense of where you

think it is.

No, I’m not suggesting that. I’m trying to get a

sense that—one of the things here is—that I discussed privately

with Dr. Marr in my office, was—and others—is us trying to get

a handle on how far along the process is and the detail is in the

administration for—before the President is presented however

many options there are. Were any of us sitting there as President,

we would want to know the answer to these questions.

Now, you all approached this from a slightly different

perspective, but you all approached it thoughtfully from your

area of expertise and interest as to what would be needed the day

after and in subsequent days. And I would like you, any one of you,

to correct me if I misrepresent what seems to be a consensus that

has emerged on this panel—and others, I might add—and that is

that there—in order for any of the scenarios you all—you individually

suggested are preferable or possible, international support for

the effort is important. And some of you, I think, would argue it’s

critical.

How important is international support—i.e., the region, the European

Union, the Japanese, others—whether it relates to—and

we’re not talking about relating to force structures going in, but

we’re relating to force structures afterwards, relating to economic

cooperation afterwards.

You said, colonel, that you believed—or one of you said that

there would be a—it would be clear that the international community

would want to come in after the fact, because they’d see opportunities,

but they’d also see the necessity to stabilize. I mean, how

certain are you that if we successfully initiated a military operation

that caused the present government in Iraq to be ousted regardless

of what immediately followed, how certain are any of you that the

international community would respond to what you’ve all identified

in varying degrees as minimum needs that would present

themselves the day after that occurred?

Doctor.

That was to be my next question. I mean, in

other words, how important is it that this be internationalized, including

Arabs? And when you gave us your very useful testimony

and your map——

And by the way, the bell went off at 5 minutes. We had agreed

we were going to go to 7 minutes, which means 10, probably. Oh,

no, I didn’t tell you that. That’s not your fault, it’s mine. And so

I’m going to just continue for a few more moments here.

Let me back up. The map 1 you gave us—and I wish we had had

it up here behind us for everyone—for the television audience to

see—essentially divides Iraq—or characterizes Iraq as sort of three

distinct regions.

You talk about how it was—I’m trying to find it here—how it

was a consequence of putting together a country after the fact,

after World War—thank you. Actually, I was looking for mine,

but—the one you gave me. It doesn’t matter now. And I want to

make sure I understand—I do understand, but I want to make sure

it’s on the record—that we’re talking about Kurds who are Sunni.

We’re talking about Sunni Arabs, and the Kurds are not Arabs.

And we’re talking about Shia Arabs. So two out of three of these

regions are Arab. Two out of three are Sunni. But they are not the

same. All Arabs aren’t Sunnis.

And the question is, is the religious tie tighter than the ethnic

tie? In other words, in terms of putting together a government that

encompasses, necessarily, all three sectors participating, at least to

the degree that they think their share of participation is commensurate

with their impact on the country, is there a closer tie between

the Kurds and the Sunni Arabs, because they’re both Sunni?

Or is there a more ethnic and cultural tie between the Sunni and

Shia Arabs? And does it—or does it matter? Is it at all relevant?

I’m not suggesting it is.

I understand.

I will end with this, because I’ve gone over my

time, and because I want to get back to the larger question I asked

in the second round or if others don’t cover it.

The reason I asked is that the Kurds have another unifying factor,

that they’re Kurds. That’s also a factor of division. There has

not been a willingness—or the kind of unity one might expect. And

you cannot see this map, but this map is colored. The border of

Iraq ends here as you all know better than I do. This pink color

is where Kurds live—people who call themselves Kurds. A whole

bunch of that pink is in Turkey. A significant part of it is in Iran.

Every Kurdish group that has come to see me over the 30 years

I’ve been a Senator has not talked about Iraq—has talked to me

and others about Kurdistan, about the Kurds. And so can we—and

I’m not being facetious now—can we easily dismiss the notion that

we are seeing, right now, and hearing explained from northern Iraq

as we speak—the newspaper articles, the television programs, and

American television, and American news—where the Kurds are basically

saying—so it’s being portrayed—‘‘Whoa, hold up a minute.

This is as good as it’s ever gotten for us right now. We essentially

have our autonomous region here in the north, which is doing just

fine. The economy’s starting to boom, we’re starting to move, nobody’s

being shot or killed, things are working out pretty well. So,

United States, what do you have in mind here? Explain to us before

you come what our rights are going to be before we get here.’’

Now, that’s what’s being projected. It’s really a question rather

than a statement. As an expert in the area, do you believe—and

I think I’ve accurately characterized the essence of the newspaper

and television articles and programs Americans have seen over the

last two, three, 4 weeks as discussion of Iraq has sort of ratcheted

up—does that play any factor that the Kurds, at the moment, think

things are better than they’ve been at least in the last 20 years,

and maybe are OK? I mean, could you all speak to that for a second?

I don’t want to overstate what I’ve been told for

the last 30 years.

I’m trying to get a sense that basically what

some have suggested to us—not Kurds—some have suggested to us

that in order to make this all work, we’re going to have to make

some commitments to the Kurds, but make some commitments to

the Turks, as well.

I’m way over my time. I’ll come back to that. Let me yield to Senator

Lugar.

No, no, this is obviously very important.

Yes.

Thank you.

Senator Feingold.

Well, I thank you, Senator. And I can assure

my—I think my colleague agrees with me—these aren’t the only

hearings we’re going to have.

This is the beginning of the process. It’s not intended

to be the end of the process.

Well, they do.

Thank you.

Let me followup with a few things, if I may. No. 1, I don’t think

any of us should lose sight—even though we didn’t ask you to do

this—any of us should lose sight of what the rationale for going

into Iraq is in the first place.

If Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction, if the President of

the United States, the Pentagon, the CIA, the Congress, everyone

thought they had no weapons of mass destruction, all you’d like to

see done in Iraq would not be done. We would not be going anywhere

in Iraq, I respectfully suggest, notwithstanding the fact

there would be equally as strong an argument for the economic development

of Iraq and the prospects of a prosperous democratic

Iraq being a—not a panacea, but opening a gate in a way to the

part of the world that needs to, at some point, on their own come

into the 21st century. But notwithstanding that, we would be doing

nothing.

So let’s everybody make sure we understand one thing. If there

is not a way and a hope, a prospect to secure those weapons of

mass destruction, this is an exercise in futility. So that’s the place

from which I think all this begins.

Now, one of the things we heard yesterday from several panels—

we had three panels of people like yourselves with slightly different

expertise—was the concern raised that if Saddam saw himself—

using an American eupheism, ‘‘going down’’—if Saddam saw his regime

coming to an end and his physical safety in jeopardy, that he

would use these weapons of mass destruction, not only against an

invading international or American force, but it was raised as the

overwhelming possibility in the minds of some of the witnesses that

he would use them against the Israelis to make this a regional war,

but also use them against his own people, that he would destroy

the Iraqi infrastructure—he would destroy the Iraqi infrastructure—

not unlike he attempted to in Kuwait when he was withdrawing

with the Kuwaiti oil fields.

And one of the things that I think the average American listening

to this—presumptous of me to say what I think the average

American—every time I say that, my wife points out—you know,

when I say ‘‘as the American people think,’’ she says, ‘‘Don’t presume

to think for the American people.’’ I don’t. But I suspect, in

my experience, anyone listening to this is saying, Now, wait a

minute. We just heard the following. We heard that we have an obligation,

if we go in, to stay. We were given estimates that it would

cost about $16 billion for the first year based on 75,000 troops. We

heard another witness say that Iraqis have an opportunity to recoup

$150 billion they lost because of their own government. We

have to make sure that oil prices stay stable and that there is no

windfall for the United States that oil prices drop. We have to

make sure that we rebuild whatever we may have to damage in

order to go in and take out Saddam, because we will be told, they

know, ‘‘You blew up this facility. You blew up our airport. You

damaged our highways. You ruined our water system. You knocked

out our electric grid. You owe us. You owe us.’’

And Americans are home, I think, thinking, Now, wait a minute.

We’re going to risk American lives. We’re going to risk American

money. We’re going to risk American prestige. And we’re going to

go in and try to take out this thing we view as a threat to us. And,

in the process, we’re going to be told by the world, which it always

tells us, by the way, you did this bad thing to us, and now you

should rebuild us. You should, out of the American treasury, take

what will amount to several hundred billion dollars before it’s over,

because that’s—we’re costing—we’re talking about just the operation

would cost roughly, if we did it alone, $75 billion, if it replicated

Desert Storm.

It doesn’t take us quick to get to $100 billion

here, and it doesn’t take much, if we do all—doctor, you want us

to do to get us up to a couple of hundred billion dollars.

And so one of the things that brings me—the reason I bother to

say all that is that I think we have to be able to explain what we’re

going to do to the American people here. Not what we’re to do to

them; what we’re going to do and how it will impact on them.

And it may be, in the minds of some, what we’re going do ‘‘to.’’

So that leads me, believe it or not, to this point. I think Senator

Lugar is correct. We need to find a McArthur that’s on the outside,

a Thomas Jefferson that’s hiding somewhere inside, a new bank account

that we don’t have yet, and a degree of tolerance on the part

of the American people that exceeds what we’ve ever asked any

other people to have. That’s kind of the worst-case combination.

But let’s set out what, as these hearings go on, are beginning to

emerge in my mind—and as my young daughter would say, we get

a get-out-of-jail-free card in this one, because I’m not sure yet of

this—but why does it not make sense for us to—as much as you

don’t like the comparison to—or any references to Afghanistan—

and it is a fundamentally different circumstance, I acknowledge—

why don’t we have a Bonn meeting now, essentially, where, professor,

we get all of the disparate groups outside and smuggle some

of those who are inside out to have the Bonn meeting before the

first American bomb or military person is launched?

Why should we not, or should we, be insisting or asking, cajoling

our allies to be part of that process, as well, now, where we begin

in a much more earnest fashion to identify who we will turn to?

Does that make sense now, if you were—if Senator Lugar were

President and you were his National Security Advisor, would you

be suggesting that to him now, or what would you—what about

that idea—those two ideas, a Bonn now—the equivalent of a

Bonn—you all know what I mean—you all know, but for the public.

After we went into Afghanistan, what we did is, we and our allies

gathered together the various warlords, representatives, et

cetera, in Bonn. We kept them there until they hammered out an

interim government. Fortunately, I think, we got a guy named

Karzai, who was able to traverse the differences. He was acceptable

to all, at least in the near term, and we set up a process—they set

up a process for a constituent assembly being elected within a

timeframe, benchmarks, which you’re talking about, Ms. Francke—

benchmarks that had to occur within a time certain with an international

commitment of dollars, which hasn’t been kept, but an

international commitment of dollars to accommodate this interim

government’s capacity to move to the next step.

Should we be doing something that detailed now, before we move

on Iraq, assuming the military situation doesn’t change drastically

and we don’t find tomorrow that he’s hoisted a—you know, a

longer-range version of a Scud with a nuclear weapon on tops of

it? I mean, should we be doing that kind of thing now?

Well, we’ve had some sort of escalating experience

in this area in the last 10 years, starting with Bosnia—very

different situations, but escalating experience of the role of international

communities, our role, what we have—and I would, if I

had to, and I don’t—but if I had to, I would predict that what will

happen here is—if we do not do a heck of a lot of this ahead of

time, what will happen is we will find exactly what you don’t want,

Mrs. Francke. We’re going to go in, and you’re going to find that—

the most organized faction that’s available after we walk in, secure

the streets, will be military.

We’re going to find—we will have had the cooperation from some

of the military, maybe even a few in the Republican Guard, possibly,

and we will find that the military, who gets dropped on them

all the time everything from setting up the hospital tent to making

the lights run to writing the constitution de facto on the ground,

they’re going to turn to the people with whom they can cooperate

with and work with the quickest and the most rapidly, and then

we’re going to have—it doesn’t mean it can’t be undone or it can’t

be redone or it can’t be made better after that, but I—I don’t

know—I’ve not heard anything yet, in practical terms——

As to how that gets avoided.

Well, as you recall—again, it’s not the same

thing, but the model which was very difficult to put together, but

nonetheless easier than what we’re talking about here—the Bonn

model in Afghanistan did, in fact, insist that that be left open, and

it was left open. It was left open so the loya jirga, in effect, filled

in the pieces here.

But let me just—there’s two more questions I wanted to—well,

there’s many more, but I have gone beyond what should be your

patience.

Oil. Yesterday, we heard significant testimony—a significant

amount of testimony that if, in the process of dealing—quote/unquote,

‘‘dealing with Saddam,’’ we had the acquiescence or cooperation

of the Russians, the acquiescence and the cooperation of the

French, that are the two mentioned, that a whole lot of other

things that created problems and dilemma would be marginally or

significantly easier to deal with down the road as we went through

this whole process.

And I raised yesterday, as some of you may have heard, the

question—and it related to reparations, and it related to debt, as

Dr. Al-Shabibi has mentioned—that the Russians believe they are

owed somewhere around $11 billion by the Iraqis, and they assume

that had contracts—they had contracts that they assume are

worth—I’ve heard various number put on it, but I—that are in the

range of $30 billion, in terms of contracts to develop and—do you

know where the oil fields are in—mainly in the south, in the Shia

region, I’m told. There’s one or some in the north, but the bulk of

it is in the south—and that they believe that this is a contractual

obligation that they have. And they believe—it is a contractual obligation

they have with Saddam—and that they are owed money

from the past.

Now, if, in fact, we were to work out, with the Russians, a deal

that said basically—the development of those oil fields, that the

new government—we will insist the new government, whatever it

is, honors those contractual commitments with you and that it be

done in some consortia where you play a significant part or not the

only part. Would that be viewed by the Iraqi people, who are initially

going to embrace us, as a matter of grand larceny, whereby

we, the United States had orchestrated an agreement whereby the

Russians are able to, along with us, I suspect, in consortia, develop

those oil fields?

I realize I’m being very precise. I realize I’m being almost

pendantic about how I’m approaching some of these things. But, at

the end of the day, I’ve found, whether I’m standing in a Pristina

or Sarajevo or wherever I am, or in Kabul, it gets down to a military

guy standing with a gun on a corner, a diplomat sitting in a

office, an indigenous person making a demand, and someone having

to make a decision on things like this.

So what happens? What happens in that—would you think that

a fair thing, doctor, or do you believe that the contractual obligations

of the Russians, for example, is, in fact, null and void, because

made by Saddam, who is already ravaged and raped that

country economically?

I’m not talking about the debt being relieved.

The debt being paid. That’s the point they would want. It won’t be

relieving the debt. That’s the very point I’m making. The Russians have——

Made it clear they want the debt paid.

No, see, that’s my point, and I’m going to end

with this. It is not a matter of negotiation. It is not a matter of

negotiation. No President of the United States can sit and say, ‘‘By

the way, we’re going to figure this out after the fact. We’re going

to negotiate this after the fact.’’ If a deal had to be made to get

Russia in, then a deal is a deal, and no one is negotiating it. It’s

being imposed. It’s being imposed.

My point I’m trying to raise here is that there’s a lot of things

that cannot be negotiated. If we wait to negotiate all of these

things, then we find ourselves in a situation where we are imposing

upon the parties involved at least a temporary chaos, and little

likelihood of anything happening.

One of the things we found from Bosnia to Kosovo to Afghanistan

is the greater degree you allow the warring factions you were trying

to liberate to have a say in the outcome, the less successful it

was, that the closer you came to imposing at the front end, ‘‘This

is how it’s going to be. We’re going to do this if we go the following

way,’’ we’ve had the greatest success. To the degree to which we

internationalize and say, ‘‘We’ll talk about it afterwards,’’ like we

did in Bosnia, the degree to which they still are not together in

Bosnia—Kosovo is actually further along than Bosnia is, in my opinion.

But, at any rate, and so I just want—again, this is about going

in with our eyes wide open. I’m not proposing this. I’m trying to

make sure that we understand that there are certain things—the

idea that the United States is going to march into Iraq, save itself

by doing away with the nuclear and chemical and biological weapons,

liberate the Iraqi people in the process, stay, to the tune of

tens of billions of dollars a year, until the Iraqi people sort it out

for themselves as to how they want to get things going, and do it

all without having to have—make agreements with the inter-

national community before we went in, I think, is not likely to happen.

It would be nice if it would, but I’ve gone way over my time.

And—but I can’t resist one last question.

What about Iran, what about Turkey, and what about Saudi Arabia,

in terms of their reaction to overwhelmingly and primarily

U.S.-led invasion of Iraq? And, at a minimum, a requirement that

a significant—you’ve all agreed that there’s going to be required an

American presence—military presence required, minimum of a

year, for 75,000 to a maximum of 20 years for a whole lot of people.

By the way—that was the argument—yesterday, the argument

was 20 years. I believe that was Mort Halperin who made that argument,

20 years, and he just happened to be sitting where you’re

sitting. I pointed to something in between. And what we’re also

told is that the one thing the Iranians are most concerned about

is a permanent U.S. military presence in Iraq. And we’re told that

the likelihood that Tehran will make a distinction between whether

we think it’s temporary and they think it’s permanent is not likely,

that they will presume, if there are large——

And, by the way, as Scott—as the colonel can tell you, if we move

in temporarily with 75,000 people, meaning a year or more, we’re

building Bondsteels—we’re building—we’re building major, major

U.S. military installations in the context of that region of the world

even if we only intend to stay there a year or 18 months or thereabouts.

And so how is that going to be viewed? You all are familiar with

Bosnia and Kosovo. We have this place called Bondsteel. It’s a fort.

It is a base. It is significant. And it sits there. And we invested—

I imagine it’s a couple of billion dollars for the whole process. And

this administration, and the last one, has no intention of staying

there permanently, doesn’t want to stay there permanently, has no

vital interest to stay there permanently, and yet we still did that.

What happens when you put up a Bondsteel? Do you think the

footprint—we keep talking about the footprint—I mean, that’s a

pretty big footprint if we’re going to have to have 75,000 people,

even for a year or two in there. There’s going to be a footprint. And

if we do what I think Scott is saying—excuse me—the colonel is

saying—and I haven’t heard anybody say something fundamentally

different—and that is, what is the mission of those people?

The mission is providing core security for the largest eight cities.

The mission is securing WMD and the facilities. We’re going to be

going around looking for them. The mission is patrolling the Iranian

border and the Kurdish areas, securing the oil fields, monitoring

the region of the Tigris and Euphrates along the Syrian border—

because there’s a lot of smuggling and a lot of things going

on there—conducting integrated disarmament and demobilization—

which I’ve never heard anyone suggest we can fail to do—and security

sector reform. Forget that. It’s not like we’re going to have a

force sitting outside of Baghdad in one fort. We’re going to have

people on the Iranian border, down in the oil fields, up in the Tigris

and Euphrates, on the—you know, on the—well, maybe not the Turkish border.st

We’re going to be all over the place. That’s a pretty big footprint,

even if it’s only for a year. How does that get—and that’s my last

question—how is that viewed, if it is predominantly American and

even though we announce ahead of time all things working—we’re

only going to be there with this kind of footprint for a year or so.

What reaction—what happens in Syria? What happens in Iran? I

mean, what is the—is there any predictable response from those countries?

Well, that’s the conundrum the President is

going to have here. All the folks in the region say, ‘‘Don’t come and

go. Don’t come and get out.’’ And they say, ‘‘And by the way, don’t

stay.’’ ‘‘Don’t come and leave it a mess, but don’t come and stay.’’

And then we leave guys and women wearing uniform sitting there

and saying, ‘‘Whoa, what’s my job here?’’

Anybody think we can come put Humpty Dumpty back together

and get out of there in months? Anybody? Anybody think we can

do it in 1 to 2 years? Anybody think we’re in the 3-to-5 year range?

Do you consider Germany nation building after World War II? Or Japan——

I’m not being argumentative.

I want to make sure——

Good.

I’m just trying to define the terms.

In direct proportion to how well you plan going

in and who you’ve got on the——

Senator Lugar.

All right.

In our generation, there was a guy, who was a

rock singer—I think his name was Clyde McPhatter—and he sang

a song called, ‘‘Timing,’’ ‘‘Ticky-ticky-tock, timing is the thing.’’

This is all timing. We don’t control this timing. We don’t control

the timing. We’re talking about, as the Senator said, we’re here be-

cause the administration and others are saying ‘‘in the very near

term.’’ I don’t know anybody who thinks in the very near term we

are going to find a solution that will satisfy the region relative to

Israel and the Palestinian question.

But you’ve been very, very kind with your time. We’d like to,

with your permission—some of our colleagues may have some questions

to submit to you in writing. We’ll not overburden you. We’re

not going to make this a summer project for you—an August

project, but—and we’d also like to know—I would like to know if

you would be available to the committee in the future, as well.

As I said, this is not the end of this process. This is the beginning,

and you’ve helped us get off to, I hope, an auspicious start.

I hope people view it—I think it is in beginning to delve into, for

the first time, at least, in the fora like this on some of the really

difficult questions. But because they’re difficult does not mean that

they are not answerable. Because they’re difficult and because this

presents us with great problems—we’ve faced more difficult problems

before, and we’ve overcome them.

And so I’m optimistic. I have a view that if we, in fact, discuss

it and debate it and reach a consensus, that there isn’t anything

we can’t do, including dealing with Saddam Hussein.

I thank you all very, very much for your indulgence, and we are

recessed until 2 o’clock, when we have a second panel. As a matter

of fact—well, 2 o’clock.

The hearing will please come to order.

I’m told that we are going to have one vote around 2:30.

Good, I hope that’s true.

This will be the last panel we have today, and the most distinguished

panel that we’ve had, two men with a considerable amount

of service to the country. The first is former Secretary of Defense,

among other things. I served here when you were running the Office

of Management and Budget. I’ve wanted to always ask you

which was more difficult.

But, at any rate, Caspar Weinberger was Secretary of Defense

from 1981 to 1987. Secretary Weinberger has served a number of

public positions, including Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission

in 1970, Deputy Director and then Director of the Office of

Management and Budget from 1970 to 1973, and Secretary of

Health, Education, and Welfare, which is what it was called then,

from 1973 to 1975, and since 1993, has been chairman of Forbes

Magazine. It’s an honor to have you back here, Mr. Chairman,

thank you for taking the time to be with us.

And we also have with us Mr. Samuel Berger. Mr. Berger served

as the National Security Advisor to President Clinton, from 1997

to 2000. Mr. Berger served as the Deputy National Security Advisor

from 1993 to 1996, and Deputy Director of the State Department

Policy and Planning staff from 1977 to 1980. Mr. Berger is

currently chairman of Stonebridge International, an international

strategy firm, and also a good friend, and I am pleased to have you here, as well, Mr. Berger.

We are in the midst of the last—I know you both know this drill

incredibly well—this the second to the last day before we recess to

go home and campaign and be with our constituents for a month,

and it is always the busiest time. But, quite frankly, we concluded,

Senator Hagel and myself and other, that there was no—we could

not defer these hearings any longer. And so I apologize—you’re the

only two I probably need not apologize to, because you’re so experienced—

but Senators are going to be in and out today, because

there’s a number of major issues on the floor as we speak. But

there is no lack of interest.

Mr. Secretary, with your permission, why don’t you begin——

And then we’ll go to Mr. Berger, and

then we’ll go to questions. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Berger.

I thank you very much.

Before we begin, or as we begin, one of the statements that you

made, Mr. Secretary, maybe in a different context or in a closed

hearing or a closed circumstance, you can tell us, but the line that

says, ‘‘I understand there is more than initial tales of small cells

acting—Kurdish groups operating in the mountain borders of Iran.

Apparently, al-Qaeda members are moving freely around Baghdad

using their Saddam-granted liberty to coordinate operations worldwide.’’

I have not heard that from any source in the U.S. Government

that I’ve kept close tabs on, but maybe at some point in another

context you can share with us the source of that.

But in the interest of just general fairness, Senator Rockefeller

has been patient and at the end of the line here. I get to stay

throughout the whole hearing. I can ask my questions at the end.

Why don’t we begin with you, Senator Rockefeller, we’ll go in order, and I’ll question last.

Rather than begin, Senator—do you want to begin now?

Oh, OK. Well, fire away.

The hearing will resume, please.

Gentlemen, the leadership said there may be a third vote immediately,

but I’ve been here 30 years, and I know that that’s likely

to take probably another 30 minutes for the third vote, so I’ve come

back and I’ll ask my questions now. The reason others aren’t back

yet is because I think they believe there may be a vote. But I don’t

believe it. So we’ll start, and if I turn out to be wrong, we’ll have

to interrupt again. And I do apologize to both of you for the interruptions.

Let me ask the question that we spent a good deal of time dwelling

on in the three panels yesterday. And in both the classified

briefings we have sought and gotten as well as the so-called outside

experts we have all here privately consulted with, the question has

been constantly raised, and that is that, is the circumstance different

this time, from Desert Storm, 1991, in that, since the

avowed purpose of using force against Saddam would be to change

the regime, meaning go to Baghdad, unless we saw him on a, you

know, helicopter heading to someplace, that, in light of that, most

of the people—well, I won’t say what they said—I’ve asked the

question, is Saddam more likely to use chemical or biological weapons—

and I limit it to that, because I’ve not heard a single voice

suggest that, at this moment, they believe he has nuclear—is it

more or less likely he would use chemical or biological weapons in

one of three circumstances—one, against the invading U.S. forces

moving on Baghdad of wherever; two, against the Israelis to widen

the war into a regional war as one of his hopes for salvation; or,

three, against his own people in a scorch-the-earth policy not unlike

he did with, not chemical or biological weapons, but with conventional

weapons, setting the oil fields of Kuwait on fire as he left?

So what probably do each of you assign to the likelihood of him

using whatever weapons of mass destruction he has available to

him this time? And if so, when and how do you think that would

most likely occur? Either one of you and in whatever order.

Mr. Berger.

One of the things that the first President Bush

did that we’ve learned after the fact, is spent a lot of time with his

top people talking with the Israelis and getting a commitment that

if they were attacked, they would not respond—they, the Israelis,

would not respond. And I assume the reason for that was their concern

that even though we had even stronger case in the region that

he had invaded a country, occupied a country, violated every norm

of international law, that if, in fact, Israel did respond in its own

self interest, that there was a risk that it would turn from Saddam

versus the coalition forces liberating an innocent country to the

Israelis and the Arabs—or at least complicating matters.

And so I hope—as a matter of fact, I’m sure, we must be considering

that possibility. I can tell you without revealing any war

plans or anything—I don’t have any—is that the Israelis have spoken

to me about that. The former Prime Minister spent 31⁄2 hours

with me talking about that. And that is, what happens if Israeli

is attacked with chemical or biological weapons.

So I guess my question is this. Is it an important part of the

planning process for a National Security Advisor or a Secretary of

Defense to be recommending to the President, if he’s going to move,

what the President should or should not be saying to the Israelis

or should or should not be planning relative to the use of these

weapons—the potential use of these weapons?

I remember that.

That’s a legacy I don’t think you’ve left.

I think one of the responsibilities I have as chairman

of this committee is—and the reason why the administration

is not here now—not demand they be here now—is that we not dis-

cuss operational plans here. And that has not occurred, and as long

as I’m chairman, will not occur, although I don’t think I’m going

to admonish any member of this committee. They all agree, both

sides of the aisle on that.

But one of the things it seems to me is our responsibility, because

it is my sense—I could be wrong, but it’s my sense that this

President and his administration understand—whether or not they

understand the constitutional responsibility, they understand the

political value of having a Congress ‘‘with them’’ as they take off

on an effort.

And from my discussions, although I want to make it clear I’ve

got no firm commitment from anybody in this administration, but

I have, at the White House, discussed the issue of whether or not

authorization would be required in the absence of an al-Qaeda connection

related to 9/11, in the absence of evidence of an imminent

attack by Iraq, and the need for our participation, the Congress’

participation and authorization. And so it’s my distinct sense—I

could be making a fool of myself here if it turns out wrong—my distinct

sense that there will be no signficant movement against Iraq,

absent consultation with the Congress, and, like his father, a request

for authorization.

I might note, parenthetically, if the right case is made, I think

he’d get an overwhelming response, positive, to it if he demonstrated

that there were certain things put in motion that would

answer some questions for members.

The reason I bother to say that is this. It seems to me that part

of our function as a committee, and the reason why we’re seeking

your advice and help, is that we should be laying out the nature

of the threat and a range of opinions relative to the nature of the

threat, and not only the nature of the threat, the timing of the

threat, the timeframe in which we have to respond to the worst

case, and then lay out for the American people what—not the certain

costs are, but what the probable costs are in terms of everything

from our treasure as it relates to life as well as it does to

property and cost.

And so that’s why I’m about to pursue a couple more questions

with you—again, not—understanding that none of us know for certain

what will happen once this is undertaken or even prior to it

being undertaken, if it is undertaken.

The last gulf war, as a coalition, which went extremely well—a

significant coalition, significant participation in the military undertaking

as well as the aftermath—cost, in today’s dollars, about $76

billion, I’m told. Is that about right? I think it was $60-some billion

in Desert Storm. And, in today’s dollars, I’m told it’s in the $75 to

$80 billion range. And of that, 80 percent of it was paid by the Japanese,

the Europeans, and others.

Now, I want to make it clear, for me at least, that if I am convinced

that Saddam has and is likely to use weapons of mass destruction,

including the nuclear capability, I think we have to be

prepared to pay any price—$70 billion, $100 billion, $150 billion,

whatever it would take—to protect our interests. But if we have to

go this alone, do either of you think—that is—when I say ‘‘go it

alone,’’ \_\_\_\_\_the military action—do any of you think there is a likeli-

hood that the cost, in just dollar terms, would be significantly less

than what it cost in Desert Storm?

Now, Mr. Secretary, you’ve indicated that they have—and I think

it’s a fairly wide consensus—considerably less conventional military

capability than they had before. Does that translate into, if we pursue

this as successfully alone as we did in conjunction with our allies

last time, if we get basing rights, overflight rights, et cetera,

that it could cost us considerably less?

Well, that’s sort of what I’m getting at here.

Granted, it is possible that instead of us assembling and being responsible

for assembling almost half a million men, not all American,

pre-positioning them over a long period of time, and then conducting

what was a very successful hundred-hour war, and then,

in relatively short order, beginning to draw down those forces, this

is premised upon, in the best-case scenario—I would call the best case

scenario—articulated by Secretary Weinberger that it would

be better to go with others and not alone, but if we go alone, we go alone.

And if we do it as successfully as we did Desert Storm—that is,

we meet the objective—the objective, a different objective this time,

not just merely pushing Iraq out of Kuwait, but taking down a regime,

which means somebody’s got to go to Baghdad, in all probability,

another 400 miles and a few other small problems—that

then, if we did this successfully, we would find willing allies and

assistance in helping us maintain the cost after the fact. After the

fact, which could be—we’ve heard testimony today from serious

people—and yesterday—that the costs could—and I’m not suggesting

either of you agree, but the testimony we’ve heard from serious

people, including—Colonel Feil, but that was yesterday—the

military guy—my mind’s blank here.

Thank you very much. I can rely upon the reporter. The Senate

reporter points out Cordesman was the one who was a very serious

guy, as well as today—Colonel Feil, with less experience, but still

very, very knowledgeable.

They’re talking about 75,000 troops staying and so on and so

forth. Even if you don’t get into those numbers, if you expect other

forces—everybody—does anybody believe that it’s possible to go in,

take down Saddam and not have some foreign military presence,

whether it’s ours or not, in Iraq for at least the near term, meaning

months, not a hundred hours, not a hundred days, but—well, that’s

a hundred days, in months, but months? I mean, aren’t we at least

signed onto that, just to literally physically assemble and order the

forces from our allies who might, after the fact, be willing to come

in—I mean, is that not—well, just logistically?

Yes.

The reason—look, I’m not trying to——

Pin you guys down. I’m just trying to get——

The only reason I pursue this, again, in terms of

sort of a full disclosure to the American people here, we are talking

about more than several billion dollars, in terms of the cost of such

an operation, and we are talking about tens of billions of dollars—

I mean, granted, there’s probably less of a—assuming chemical and

biological weapons aren’t used, which could greatly escalate the

cost, in terms of human life and other ways, but there is also the

requirement this time to stay longer, whatever that means. It could

be weeks, it could be months, it could be, in some people’s minds,

years, but it’s longer.

Yes.

Yes.

Well, that may be a good jump-off point. If Grenada

had sunk into the bottom of the Caribbean, the events of the

world would not have changed, God love the Grenadians, if that’s

the correct way to pronounce it. If Grenada had signed a security

pact with the Soviet Union, it would not have made a whole lot of

difference. Iraq is so fundamentally different in terms of this regard.

You said, Mr. Secretary, I thought, that we have to demonstrate

we have the staying power, that—not only to take Saddam

down, I assume you meant, but to not walk away with the region

more destabilized than when we arrived.

Well, I—by the way, I’m not disagreeing—that if

we did it right, we could—I’m just trying to get broad parameters

here. I would—I mean, look how long—I mean, some have compared

the need here to be the kind of commitment after the fact

we made to Japan and Germany. That’s one extreme. The other extreme

is Grenada. And in between are experiences we had, like

Kosovo and Bosnia, where we had broad coalition support, where

we had a signficant success, where we routed the opposition, and

where we still have 7,000 forces. But——

Yes.

Yes. Well, again, I’m not looking for a very fine

point. But we do know, in just broad macro terms, to have even the

minimum number of forces that anyone has suggested in anything

that’s been leaked or discussed that I’ve heard, we’re talking about

tens of thousands of forces going in. We may not be talking about

a quarter of a million. We may be talking about 75,000, but we’re

talking a lot of forces. We’re talking about it taking more than a

hundred hours—not the victory, but before we can leave.

And so, again, to give some sense of proportion to the American

people when we ask them for their permission, through their Congress,

to go in, if we ask them that——

I think we have an obligation to tell

them this is going to cost a lot of money. I’m not suggesting we

shouldn’t pay it, but it may cost a lot of money.

Oh, by the way, I agree.

I agree. I’m sorry, I thought I said at the outset—

as I said at the outset, if we can make the case, which I

think—well, I won’t say what I think yet; the hearings aren’t finished—

but if we can make the case that the threat is real and dire,

that a free and democratic Iraq, if it could be accomplished, could

have a cleansing impact on that part of the world and make our

life easier significantly down the road, which I think could be made

in an ideal circumstance—not even an ideal, in a—if we do things

right—that it is worth the price.

So I’m assuming we wouldn’t vote to give the President the authority

to do this unless we thought that the price—or the potential

damage to us was so significant, and the price of victory was worth

it. But we then ultimately have to tell them what the price is. And

I don’t mean in literal dollar terms; I mean in terms of reasonable

things we could anticipate.

But I can anticipate, since my staff just said there’s 1 minute left

in the vote, that my colleagues were more correct than I was about

how certain the next vote was going to be. They’re probably literally

on their way back. The first one in, please authorize them

to begin the hearing. We’re not going to trespass on your time

much longer, but I am going to have to go vote. So we’ll recess until

the first Senator, Democrat or Republican, returns, and we’ll begin

the questioning with them.

Thank you.

Will the Senator yield on that point

for a just a moment?

We heard testimony yesterday from one of the

witnesses saying that they thought that the reason—they thought,

in their discussions with Iraqis, that Iraqis believe and Saddam’s

cadre believed that the reason we stopped is because they had

chemical and biological weapons. I have not heard anyone assert

that the reason President Bush decided to stop was his fear of concern

about or thought that chemical weapons would be used

against American forces. And so—but I’ve not heard anybody make

the assertion that President Bush, one, stopped because of concern

about chemical or biological weapons.

To beg the indulgence of my colleagues just a

minute more, the context in which this discussion took place yesterday

was whether or not deterrence worked. And it was argued

by one of the witnesses that deterrence worked, the threat of

annihalation essentially issued by Bush, one, to Saddam was the

reason why Saddam did not use his chemical or biological weapons.

Another witness responded and said, ‘‘Well, in Iraq they say the

reason we didn’t keep going was a threat that Saddam would use

them.’’ Deterrence doesn’t work, deterrence does. If we believed

that threatening him and his very existence of his regime with

massive retaliation were he to use them, then obviously it alters

the equation of whether or not there is a requirement to move,

whether containment works, and so on. That was the context of the

discussion.

Gentlemen, we’ve taken you longer than usually,

but, as I said, you’re pros, you’re not surprised, I guess.

I want to make it clear, which I hope it’s clear—I know it’s clear

to both of you that—we’ve completed two days of hearings. There’s

much more to explore and—as I said, and Secretary Weinberger

implied, I fully expect the administration will consult with this

committee and with the Congress as a whole. And this is just the

beginning of the process here.

The debate, discussion, and decisionmaking goes on at the White

House now, and it will continue to occur here. Both the Congress

and the President have some difficult decisions to make here. Ultimately,

whatever course of action is taken will be proposed by the

President, and we will respond. And it is my hope and expectation

that we have at least shed some light on the complexity of the

problem, but I do not leave after 2 days concluding that it is not

a soluble problem, that it is not a problem—that is, Saddam Hussein—

that we can succeed in our objective, which I said at the outset,

either we separate him from his weapons, or him from Iraq.

And I think the latter is the more likely thing to happen, but I

think it does matter how we do it, when we do it, and that the

American people are fully informed and we have their fully informed consent.

So you’ve been, as usual, both very good, and I cannot promise

you I will not ask you back again. My expectation is I will be asking

you again. I hope you will be as accommodating with your time

as you have been in the past when we resume these hearings.

I want to congratulate the staff—Tony Blinken, the new staff director,

as well as the Republican staff director, and all the staffs

for putting together what I hope everyone understands was a truly

bipartisan and thoroughly balanced discussion of the problems that

we face and the opportunities we have.

And so we will—I leaned back to you a moment ago and indicated

that I hope they will—not hope—I have asked them, so I do

hope, since I’ve asked them, that they will summarize what we

have learned here for us and put together a proposal for Senator

Lugar and me—and hopefully, by then, Senator Helms and me—

to consider as we proceed in the fall with further discussion of the

issues relating to Iraq.

With that, gentlemen, unless you have a closing comment——

Well, thank you all very much. We are adjourned.